OPTIMAL INCENTIVE CONTRACTS WITH IMPERFECT INFORMATION

被引：432
|
作者：
HARRIS, M
RAVIV, A
机构：
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1979年 / 20卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0022-0531(79)90073-5
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：231 / 259
页数：29
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