A MANAGERIAL INCENTIVE FOR WORKPLACE ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

被引:0
|
作者
Samaranayake, Viraj [1 ]
Gamage, Chandana [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Moratuwa, Dept Comp Sci & Engn, Moratuwa 10400, Sri Lanka
关键词
Electronic monitoring; Software professionals; Relevance to work; Personal judgment of effectiveness; Invasion of privacy;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
Electronic monitoring at workplace is a rapidly growing phenomenon in the modern world. It allows employers to observe what employees do on the job and review employee communications, including e-mail and internet activity that employees consider private. In a survey done among the software development organizations in Sri Lanka, it was found that majority of the companies use some means of electronic technology to monitor their employees. Most of the time, employee perception towards electronic monitoring at work, contradicts with the need for law enforcement within the organization as intended by the top management. Employers justify electronic monitoring at workplace in terms of protecting the company's confidential information, preventing the misuse of the organizational resources while uplifting the quality of work and productivity. On the other hand, the mutual trust that should be there between the employer and the employee is brought into question by such monitoring. The research results presented in this paper are based on a study that investigated electronic monitoring in multiple perspectives from the view point of software professionals in Sri Lanka. The study focused on analyzing managerial incentives for electronic monitoring at workplace, to find how it could significantly influence organizational IT security policy making. The research was based on an empirical study with a structured questionnaire, utilizing disproportionate stratified random sampling. The research study collected data on important issues such as Perceived Level of Infringement, Perceived Relevance to Work, Perceived Invasion of Privacy and Personal Judgment of Effectiveness of the software professionals, in Sri Lanka. The research found that if electronic monitoring is intended for a valid purpose, it is generally accepted by the software professionals. Majority of the subjects responded against electronic monitoring if it invades their privacy. However, they accepted electronic monitoring to a certain extent if it monitors only the tasks associated with the job. Further the respondents did not object to having electronic monitoring at workplace if it is to ensure their quality of work. The findings of this research can be incorporated in IT security policy making in the software development organizations in Sri Lanka and in similar economics with large scale offshore software development enterprises, with a special emphasis on the employees, which is the most valuable asset of the organization.
引用
收藏
页码:87 / 100
页数:14
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