CONDORCET EFFICIENCY AND CONSTANT SCORING RULES

被引：30

|

作者：

GEHRLEIN, WV

机构：

来源：

MATHEMATICAL SOCIAL SCIENCES | 1982年 / 2卷 / 02期

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0165-4896(82)90061-0

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：123 / 130

页数：8

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