COLLUSION AND DOWNSTREAM ENTRY IN A VERTICALLY INTEGRATED INDUSTRY
被引:1
|
作者:
Avenel, Eric
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Rennes 1, UMR CNRS 6211, CREM, Rennes, FranceUniv Rennes 1, UMR CNRS 6211, CREM, Rennes, France
Avenel, Eric
[1
]
Caprice, Stephane
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Univ Toulouse Capitole, INRA, Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, FranceUniv Rennes 1, UMR CNRS 6211, CREM, Rennes, France
Caprice, Stephane
[2
]
机构:
[1] Univ Rennes 1, UMR CNRS 6211, CREM, Rennes, France
[2] Univ Toulouse Capitole, INRA, Toulouse Sch Econ, Toulouse, France
来源:
REVUE ECONOMIQUE
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2018年
/
69卷
/
01期
关键词:
Collusion;
vertical integration;
entry;
D O I:
10.3917/reco.pr2.0110
中图分类号:
F [经济];
学科分类号:
02 ;
摘要:
We analyze the sustainability of an agreement in the presence of a threat of entry in a context where incumbent firms are vertically integrated. Entrants depend on integrated firms for their supplies. While the entry leaves collusion profits unchanged, we show that deviation profits are also unchanged and that entry lowers profits in punishment periods. In this sense, the possibility of entry facilitates collusion between integrated firms.