ON DURATION OF THINKING IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF DESCARTES

The article investigates the hypothesis of a weakened position of God in Descartes' project of philosophy. If God is the one who holds all things in being, including the thinking ones (res cogitans), then the weakening of His position calls into question the notion of duration (duratio), which Descartes did not define in details. We investigate this concept. If we accept the assertion of Descartes that God supports us from moment to moment (this produces duration), then two problems arise: 1) whom God's support is directed to: the thinking thing or the "complete" substance, i.e. the composite of body and mind; 2) if the support is still focused on the being of a thinking thing, then the latter can not be described in terms of time, because time is a measure of movement, but thinking is motionless; 3) if keeping in being is described in terms of power, or effort, then what it can be compared to? The answer to the first question is the consideration that as God's support is not tangible and does not depend on any finite subjects, then He supports us not as substances, but as conservatum. The second problem is clearly solved by the fact that we must interpret the moments not as moments of time, but as moments of duration; and the moment of duration is a force, which holds us in being. Therefore, the answer to the second question depends entirely on the solution of the third one. To answer it, we turn to the Cartesian construction "just a conceivable distinction", which indicates the possibility of perception of false beings. This "zero degree of objectivity" helps up to make a comparison with the force of holding in being. The phenomenon, which appears as a result of this analysis, namely, to focus attention on the things known to be false, plays a significant role in the structure of duration. The context in which particular importance of memory is detected is that it is a witness of insignificant being, which non-existent items obviously are. It is concluded that in the structure of Cartesian metaphysics memory plays an invisible, but crucial role.