An altrusitic citizen votes 'yes' in a referendum if the perceived benefit of the project exceeds its perceived cost. The altruist gets information about benefits and costs from contributions to the 'pro' and 'con' campaigns. In the Nash equilibrium of a campaign-contribution game with two beneficiaries, altruists vote on the side with the largest contribution, and altruistic voting guarantees efficient choices. If there are many agents, however, altruistic voters do not always make efficient choices. A disclosure law that provides information about the number of beneficiaries increases the efficiency of the referedum process.
机构:
Louisiana State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Manship Sch Mass Commun, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USALouisiana State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Manship Sch Mass Commun, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA
Dunaway, Johanna
Stein, Robert M.
论文数: 0引用数: 0
h-index: 0
机构:
Rice Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Houston, TX 77251 USALouisiana State Univ, Dept Polit Sci, Manship Sch Mass Commun, Baton Rouge, LA 70803 USA