ALTRUISTIC VOTING AND CAMPAIGN CONTRIBUTIONS

被引:2
|
作者
HELSLEY, RW [1 ]
OSULLIVAN, A [1 ]
机构
[1] OREGON STATE UNIV,DEPT ECON,CORVALLIS,OR 97331
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0047-2727(94)90083-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
An altrusitic citizen votes 'yes' in a referendum if the perceived benefit of the project exceeds its perceived cost. The altruist gets information about benefits and costs from contributions to the 'pro' and 'con' campaigns. In the Nash equilibrium of a campaign-contribution game with two beneficiaries, altruists vote on the side with the largest contribution, and altruistic voting guarantees efficient choices. If there are many agents, however, altruistic voters do not always make efficient choices. A disclosure law that provides information about the number of beneficiaries increases the efficiency of the referedum process.
引用
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页码:107 / 119
页数:13
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