FINANCIAL INCENTIVES FOR COST CONTROL UNDER MORAL HAZARD

被引：5
|
作者：
RYAN, PJ
HENIN, CG
GANDHI, DK
机构：
来源：
OMEGA-INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MANAGEMENT SCIENCE | 1986年 / 14卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0305-0483(86)90041-1
中图分类号：
C93 [管理学];
学科分类号：
12 ; 1201 ; 1202 ; 120202 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：221 / 231
页数：11
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