AGENCY RESEARCH IN MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING - A 2ND LOOK

被引:246
作者
BAIMAN, S
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0361-3682(90)90023-N
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
This paper surveys the recent agency literature, emphasizing its managerial accounting implications. The paper first describes and compares three branches of the agency literature. Attention is paid to the assumptions, focus, contributions and criticisms of each branch. Empirical tests of implications of the agency model are reviewed. Recent theoretical agency papers with managerial accounting implications are then discussed. The last section of the paper discusses possible directions in future research which may increase the insights which the agency paradigm can bring to managerial accounting research. © 1990.
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页码:341 / 371
页数:31
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