Securing the Administrative Appeals Tribunal's independence: Tenure and mechanisms of appointment

被引:1
|
作者
Morgan, James [1 ]
机构
[1] Univ Adelaide, Adelaide Law Sch, Adelaide, SA, Australia
关键词
Administrative law; executive powers; judicial independence; legal change; merits review; public law; tribunals;
D O I
10.1177/1037969X18790046
中图分类号
D9 [法律]; DF [法律];
学科分类号
0301 ;
摘要
The Administrative Appeals Tribunal must be independent from inappropriate influence, and the perception of such influence, in order to effectively perform its duties of de novo merits review of government decisions. Drawing on recent controversies surrounding the Administrative Appeals Tribunal in 2017, this article concludes that the current mechanisms of Administrative Appeals Tribunal member reappointment exposes the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to a risk of inappropriate influence by the government of the day or at least a risk of public perception to that effect. After examining several possible reforms to minimise this risk, this paper proposes the creation of an independent reappointment committee for the Administrative Appeals Tribunal.
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页码:302 / 308
页数:7
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