Market power in transportation: Spatial equilibrium under Bertrand competition

被引：2
|
作者：
Anderson, Simon P. [1 ]
Wilson, Wesley W. [2 ]
机构：
[1] Univ Virginia, Dept Econ, Charlottesville, VA 22903 USA
[2] Univ Oregon, Dept Econ, Eugene, OR 97403 USA
来源：
ECONOMICS OF TRANSPORTATION | 2015年 / 4卷 / 1-2期
关键词：
Spatial competition; Barge-rail Bertrand pricing;
D O I：
10.1016/j.ecotra.2014.11.002
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
We examine spatial competition along a waterway when shippers are distributed over space. Competition is between barge and rail companies and among barge companies. Equilibrium prices are derived for two variations: oligopolistic rivalry between barge and rail operators, and oligopolistic rivalry among barge operators with terminals located at different points on the waterway. In the first variant, each mode has an advantage over some shippers and transporters' overprice cost advantages (puce differences are too small in equilibrium). The second variant delivers a "chain-linked" system of markets, whereby cost changes in one market are passed through equilibrium prices to other markets. Barge operators with cost advantages parlay these into market size advantages. (C) 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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页码：7 / 15
页数：9
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