MORAL HAZARD AND NONMARKET INSTITUTIONS - DYSFUNCTIONAL CROWDING OUT OR PEER MONITORING

被引：0

作者：

ARNOTT, R ^{[1
]}

STIGLITZ, JE ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,DEPT ECON,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1991年 / 81卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

暂无

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：179 / 190

页数：12

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