MORAL HAZARD AND NONMARKET INSTITUTIONS - DYSFUNCTIONAL CROWDING OUT OR PEER MONITORING

被引：0
|
作者：
ARNOTT, R [1 ]
STIGLITZ, JE [1 ]
机构：
[1] STANFORD UNIV,DEPT ECON,STANFORD,CA 94305
来源：
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW | 1991年 / 81卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
暂无
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
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页码：179 / 190
页数：12
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