LEIBNIZ AND THE CONCEPT OF ANALOGY

In this paper an analysis of the leibnizian applications of concept of analogy as well as the analogical reasoning is approached. Thus, the analysis tries to show that the leibnizian concept of analogy is based on the idea of structural similarity. As a consequence of such consideration, two basic ways in which Leibniz applies analogical reasoning are examined. he first way has a conjectural character and is rather heuristic, whereas the second constitutes, at least in intention, a kind of demonstrative analogical reasoning, since it tries to prove its conclusions for a determined theoretical domain by applying a transfer principle, which is itself founded on the identity of structural properties. his procedure is exemplified by outlining the leibnizian view on contingent truths. In this way, the paper concludes by pointing out the theoretical relevance of the concept of similarity in the leibnizian thought.