Intervention may cause as well as calm internal wars. One way it may cause them is captured by the concept of moral hazard, which suggests that domestic groups which would not otherwise resort to political violence may be encouraged to do so by the prospect of outside support. In this piece we unpack and examine the descriptive and causal logic of that concept of moral hazard. First, we explore the links from our concept of moral hazard to more general social science concepts-perverse incentives, negative precedents and unintended consequences. Second, we focus on three key propositions embodied in that concept which explain how intervention may cause internal wars, and indicate empirical patterns which must obtain if the explanations are to be valid. These three are: 1) that the rebels' resort to political violence is induced by incentives created by the intervenor's actions-and not by a change in their underlying motivation; 2) that the result is harmful to the intervenor's goals and interests; and 3) that the intervenor did not intend to induce that result. Next, we distinguish between moral hazard as a remote versus proximate cause of conflict and between using it to explain a single conflict and to explain multiple conflicts. We then map out the four main explanatory contexts implied by these categories and discuss issues attending each of them. Finally, we conclude with key points to consider when advancing or opposing moral hazard explanations of internal war.
