COMMITMENT AND OBSERVABILITY IN GAMES

被引：143
|
作者：
BAGWELL, K
机构：
[1] Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston
来源：
GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR | 1995年 / 8卷 / 02期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80001-6
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
Models of commitment make two assumptions: there is a first mover, and his action is perfectly observed by the subsequent mover. The purpose of this apper is to disentangle these two assumptions, in order to see if a strategic benefit from commitment remains when the first mover's choice is imperfectly observed. The basic finding is that the first-mover advantage is eliminated when there is even a slight amount of noise associated with the observation of the first mover's selection. (C) 1995 Academic Press, Inc.
引用
收藏
页码：271 / 280
页数：10
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