PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION IN HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHICAL THOUGHT

In Western philosophy the problem of individuation is formulated and developed in details and comprehensively. It appears twisted in a variety of major questions, which are the center of ontological problematics. So, in the article the long history of formation of concept ''individuation'' is traced. The conclusion is made that this difficult and undeveloped concept, on the one hand, designating logical-gnoseological process of differentiating between the special and the general, on the other hand, explaining the way an individual originality of the real is reached. As a result, it is obviously possible for the author to allocate three ontological principles of individuation: 1) the principle of creation introduced by F. Suarez, i.e., the position that God creates the real, whose life is defined and limited from within by its own nature; 2) the principle of isolation introduced by Th. Aquinas as a certain external material reason, by means of which the same kind of the real is different from the other real; 3) the principle of originality introduced by G. Leibniz, i.e., the possibility of infinity is in the monad of accidents that create individuality of the real. In the 19th century the concept of God and ontological problematics become object of curses and sneers. In philosophy there is a revision of the existing values, which, finally, degenerated in the concept of an ''uncertain person''. So, representation is formed about the person who is not an individuality, not a complete, inseparable real, but a ''dividuality'', an essentially divided, broken, distraught person deprived of integrity. Thus, it seems possible to find the subject, to isolate it from totality. C.G. Jung carried out this attempt. Individuation in the theory of Jung was not so much an ontological necessity of explanation of a specific variety of the real, but an anthropological necessity of self-preservation in the face of totality. So, slightly concerned by individuation principles of creation, isolation and originality that Suarez, Aquinas and Leibniz confirmed accordingly, Jung deduces individuation as a principle of self-preservation of the individual, and it cannot be named an ontological principle of individuation any more as it solves the problem particularly at the anthropological level. We have seen that the Western philosophy, and all Western tradition in understanding of how things are individualized, addresses to God as a transcendental substance. However, the person appears powerless in life: from acceptance of the axiom of life of God, reasoning of the pass to the real world. So, all Western tradition tears off life from the real. And the final evidence of individuation connection with the most concrete concept real by nature is when the person is identified with an individual class, which occurs by P. Florensky in concentrating the general essence in an individual thing. Thus, a complete philosophic-methodological analysis of individuation is possible only when considering its ontological and anthropological specificity.