HOW TO LIMIT THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS OF INSIDER LABOR-MARKETS

被引:0
|
作者
ARTUS, P
KAABI, M
机构
来源
REVUE ECONOMIQUE | 1994年 / 45卷 / 03期
关键词
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
Wage formation with insiders'labor markets is such that unemployed are not hired again when the economy recovers. We analyse the effects on.this perverse dynamics of wages and employment of the implementation of a centralized wage bargaining, of firing costs, or of the replacement of a monopolistic wage determination by a bargaining between firms and unions. We finally examine on time-series data if econometric estimations confirm the existence of an insiders'labor market in France.
引用
收藏
页码:369 / 384
页数:16
相关论文
共 50 条