This paper analyzes the three components of the evidence operation: proof premises or evidence in the strict sense, with particular regard to the distinction between evidence declaration and critical/circumstantial evidence; the propositions to be proved, principal or incidental, final or intermediate; the act of proving, connoted by the rule of beyond all reasonable doubt. While the first two terms vary according to the procedural context, the third remains indefectible, since it is incongruous to consider any proposition to be 'proven' while there is a reasonable reason to doubt it. With regard to the distribution of the burden of proof, the structure of the case and its legal qualification, whether substantial or procedural, are decisive. Therefore, it is possible to identify, for each decision alternative, the term 'marked', which conveys the proposition to be proved, and the opposite 'consequential' term, which derives from the failure to reach the proof: for example, with respect to the main object in trial, the term 'marked' is the conviction, the term 'consequential' the acquittal.