ABELIAN SYMMETRY GROUPS IN SOCIAL CHOICE

被引:2
|
作者
KELLY, JS
机构
[1] Department of Economics, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY 13210, Maxwell Hall
关键词
ABELIAN GROUPS; SOCIAL CHOICE; SYMMETRY;
D O I
10.1016/0165-4896(92)90022-W
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
For every finite abelian group G there exists (i) a social choice rule f for which the group of permutations of individuals leaving f unchanged is isomorphic to G; and (ii) a social choice rule g for which the group of permutations of alternatives leaving g unchanged is isomorphic to G.
引用
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页码:15 / 25
页数:11
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