EQUILIBRIA OF THE SEALED-BID MECHANISM FOR BARGAINING WITH INCOMPLETE INFORMATION

被引：83
|
作者：
LEININGER, W
LINHART, PB
RADNER, R
机构：
[1] AT&T BELL LABS,MURRAY HILL,NJ 07974
[2] NYU,NEW YORK,NY 10003
来源：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY | 1989年 / 48卷 / 01期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0022-0531(89)90120-8
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
引用
收藏
页码：63 / 106
页数：44
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