An Examination of the Differential Impact of Regulation FD on Analysts' Forecast Accuracy

被引：27

作者：

Findlay, Scott ^{[1
]}

Mathew, Prem ^{[2
]}

机构：

[1] Univ Saskatchewan, Saskatoon, SK, Canada

[2] Oregon State Univ, Coll Business, Dept Accounting Finance & Informat Management, 418 Bexell Hall, Corvallis, OR 97331 USA

来源：

FINANCIAL REVIEW | 2006年 / 41卷 / 01期

关键词：

disclosure; fair disclosure; earnings forecast accuracy; Regulation FD; Reg FD; Regulation Fair Disclosure; Fair Disclosure rules; analysts; brokerage analysts; security analysts; analyst forecasts; corporate guidance; pre-announcement guidance;

D O I：

10.1111/j.1540-6288.2006.00130.x

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

Regulation fair disclosure (FD) requires companies to publicly disseminate information, effectively preventing the selective pre-earnings announcement guidance to analysts common in the past. We investigate the effects of Regulation FD's reducing information disparity across analysts on their forecast accuracy. Proxies for private information, including brokerage size and analyst company-specific experience, lose their explanatory power for analysts' relative accuracy after Regulation FD. Analyst forecast accuracy declines overall, but analysts that are relatively less accurate (more accurate) before Regulation FD improve (deteriorate) after implementation. Our findings are consistent with selective guidance partially explaining variation in the forecasting accuracy of analysts before Regulation FD.

引用

页码：9 / 31

页数：23