COMPENSATION POLICY AND THE INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITY SET

被引:80
|
作者
GAVER, JJ
GAVER, KM
机构
关键词
D O I
10.2307/3665874
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
We analyze the proportions of executive pay derived from salary, bonus, long-term incentive compensation, and stock-based compensation for a sample of 321 Fortune 1,000 firms in 1992. We find that firms with abundant investment opportunities pay higher levels of total compensation to their executives. Executives of growth firms receive a larger portion of their compensation from long-term incentive compensation (such as performance awards, restricted stock grants, and stock option grants), while those of non-growth firms receive a larger portion of their pay from fixed salary. An implication is that long-term incentive contracts reduce agency costs associated with manager-shareholder information asymmetries in growth firms.
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页码:19 / 32
页数:14
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