BUREAUCRATS VERSUS VOTERS - POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF RESOURCE-ALLOCATION BY DIRECT DEMOCRACY

被引：279
作者：
ROMER, T
ROSENTHAL, H
机构：
[1] HOOVER INST,WASHINGTON,DC
[2] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305
来源：
QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1979年 / 93卷 / 04期
基金：
美国国家科学基金会;
关键词：
D O I：
10.2307/1884470
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
I. The setter’s problem under certainty and the importance of the reversion point,565.-II. Budget-maximizing with uncertain turnout, 571.—III. Exploiting a sequence of elections, 579.—IV. Implications for empirical research, 581.—Appendix, 585. © 1979 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College.
引用
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页码：563 / 587
页数：25
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