BEYOND THE PRISONERS-DILEMMA - TOWARD MODELS TO DISCRIMINATE AMONG MECHANISMS OF COOPERATION IN NATURE

被引:85
作者
DUGATKIN, LA
MESTERTONGIBBONS, M
HOUSTON, AI
机构
[1] UNIV OXFORD, DEPT ZOOL, OXFORD OX1 3PS, ENGLAND
[2] UNIV KENTUCKY, SCH BIOL SCI, LEXINGTON, KY 40506 USA
[3] FLORIDA STATE UNIV, DEPT MATH, TALLAHASSEE, FL 32306 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0169-5347(92)90074-L
中图分类号
Q14 [生态学(生物生态学)];
学科分类号
071012 ; 0713 ;
摘要
The iterated prisoner's dilemma game, or IPD, has now established itself as the orthodox paradigm for theoretical investigations of the evolution of cooperation; but its scope is restricted to reciprocity, which is only one of three categories of cooperation among unrelated individuals. Even within that category, a cooperative encounter has in general three phases, and the IPD has nothing to say about two of them. To distinguish among mechanisms of cooperation in nature, future theoretical work on the evolution of cooperation must distance itself from economics and develop games as a refinement of ethology's comparative approach.
引用
收藏
页码:202 / 205
页数:4
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