DEGREE OF SUPERVISION, MORAL HAZARD, AND HIERARCHICAL CONTROL

被引:3
|
作者
YANG, YL
机构
[1] San Diego State University, San Diego
关键词
FIRM OBJECTIVES;
D O I
10.1016/0167-2681(94)00011-3
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
This paper discusses the payoff of establishing a hierarchical structure in a-production supervision environment using agency theory perspective. The principal's limited degree of supervision and the agents' moral hazard problem explain the rationale of separating the. principal from direct production supervision. The circumstances that the principal can benefit from the expanded hierarchy are examined in this paper.
引用
收藏
页码:93 / 105
页数:13
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