This article contributes to answering the question: What has happened to Sikh ethnonationalism? I argue that the decline of this phenomenon can best be explained by examining the changing interests, incentive structures, and patterns of dominance and legitimacy of various Sikh political actors in Punjab - that is, the institutional structures on which mass community mobilization occurs. More specifically, I argue that the sustained mass mobilization of Sikhs is not possible without the active encouragement of the components of the institutionalized 'Sikh political system' including the dominant Akali Dal, Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee, and Akal Takht. All of these are currently under the leadership of Parkash Singh Badal, and remain committed to moderation and non-confrontation with the central state. This conceptual argument is illustrated through detailed empirical analysis of the trajectory and eventual failure of the 2013 and 2014-2015 hunger strikes by Gurbaksh Singh Khalsa for the release of Sikh 'political prisoners' in India.