MIND, MATTER, AND DEATH - COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND THE PROBLEM OF SURVIVAL

The implications of recent developments in cognitive neuroscience for the survival problem are examined. The following three questions are addressed: (a) Is the conscious mind identical with or something other than the material structures and processes in the brain? (b) If the mind can be considered to be separate from the brain, can the location and nature of the interaction between mind and brain be pinned down? (c) Could the mind or a portion thereof survive the death and dissolution of the brain? The mind-brain problem is discussed, with specific focus on the implications of connectionist, or computer neural net, models for the resolution of that problem. The specific interactionist models of Thouless and Wiesner, Eccles, Penfield, and others are examined, with particular attention paid to the implications of split-brain research and ''modular'' models of the mind for a theory of interactionism. Finally, the question of which aspects of the mind might survive death is addressed.