UNNATURAL MONOPOLY

被引：25

作者：

ESTRIN, S

DEMEZA, D

机构：

[1] UNIV EXETER,DEPT ECON,EXETER EX4 4RJ,DEVON,ENGLAND

[2] LONDON BUSINESS SCH,LONDON NW1 4SA,ENGLAND

来源：

JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 57卷 / 03期

关键词：

STATUTORY MONOPOLY; DEREGULATION; ENTRY;

D O I：

10.1016/0047-2727(95)80007-V

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

This paper investigates the merits of statutory monopoly as a means of preventing wasteful market fragmentation. The key result is that a public firm committed to price at cost may be unable to repel entry even when it is socially desirable that it should do so. Limited entry may be worse than either statutory monopoly or free entry. The robustness of results when competition stimulates a state firm to lower its costs is also examined.

引用

页码：471 / 488

页数：18

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