Proponents argue that rational choice theory is a form of positive science, one whose simplified model of the human psyche generates useful predictions of human behavior, But their assumptions are contrary to fact. Their analyses of public policy decisions are cast in terms of the sharp and now largely discredited distinction logical positivists drew between ''facts'' and ''values'' or efficient ''means'' and affective ''ends,'' And their models arouse suspicions concerning and objections to the political and psychological effects of the methods they employ and the policy options they endorse, All of this makes the theory not only less useful for understanding politics but also more subject to criticism by ''post-modern'' thinkers than it need be, Were its proponents explicitly to acknowledge the ''prescriptive'' character of ''rational choice,'' however, they would help foster a broader discussion of the different kinds of rationality and their interaction in the formulation of public policy, That discussion of the forms of rationality would, in turn, bring out a more complex view of the psychological basis of both politics and rationality.