THE EFFECTS OF CHOICE AND INCENTIVES ON THE OVERESTIMATION OF FUTURE PERFORMANCE

被引:25
|
作者
HENRY, RA
机构
关键词
D O I
10.1006/obhd.1994.1012
中图分类号
B849 [应用心理学];
学科分类号
040203 ;
摘要
Two studies were designed to investigate factors hypothesized to influence the accuracy of performance-related statements (both performance predictions and self-set goals). In Experiment 1, subjects were either allowed to choose a specific version of the performance task or were assigned a version of the task prior to making performance-related statements. In Experiment 2, monetary incentives were manipulated prior to requests for either estimates or self-set goals. Results indicate significant sex-by-choice and sex-by-incentives interactions on both predictions and goals. In general, males responded to incentives and choice by becoming more extreme in their performance predictions and goals. However, females did not respond to incentives and choice as would be predicted by general principles such as "wishful thinking" (Slovic, 1966) and "illusion of control" (Langer, 1975). These results are discussed in the context of gender research in achievement settings and organizational theories of motivation. © 1994 by Academic Press, Inc.
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页码:210 / 225
页数:16
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