ON THE ROBUSTNESS OF CONTESTABILITY THEORY

被引：1
|
作者：
AGLIARDI, E
机构：
[1] European University Institute, Florence
来源：
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION | 1990年 / 8卷 / 03期
关键词：
D O I：
10.1016/0167-7187(90)90009-P
中图分类号：
F [经济];
学科分类号：
02 ;
摘要：
The robustness of contestability theory is discussed with special attention to the role of price response lags. The possibility of collusion in the post-entry game is examined by modeling an infinitely repeated game. Moreover, the 'hit-and-run' strategy is obtained as the unique subgame perfect equilibrium of a repeated game with infinite horizon, under certain conditions. © 1990.
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页码：485 / 490
页数：6
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