MANDATES AND POLICY OUTPUTS - UNITED-STATES PARTY PLATFORMS AND FEDERAL EXPENDITURES

被引:159
作者
BUDGE, I [1 ]
HOFFERBERT, RI [1 ]
机构
[1] SUNY BINGHAMTON,POLIT SCI,BINGHAMTON,NY 13901
关键词
D O I
10.2307/1963632
中图分类号
D0 [政治学、政治理论];
学科分类号
0302 ; 030201 ;
摘要
Political parties in the United States are usually regarded as too weak and decentralized, too much the prey of office-seeking politicians and special interests, to function effectively as programmatic., policy-effecting agents within the separation of powers. This has been taken as a serious flaw in the U.S. version of representative democracy, prompting cycles of proposed reform; criticisms of the existing set-up as a capitalistic sham; or alternative justifications of the system as pluralist rather than strictly party democracy. Our research challenges these assumptions by demonstrating the existence of strong links between postwar (1948—1985) election platforms and governmental outputs. Platforms' sentences, coded into one of 54 subject categories, are used as indicators of programmatic emphases and are related to corresponding federal expenditure shares. Resulting regression models demonstrate the full applicability of party mandate theory to the United States, and they operationalize its U.S. variants concretely. © 1990, American Political Science Association. All rights reserved.
引用
收藏
页码:111 / 131
页数:21
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