Audit committee membership: The interplay with general corporate law

In the authors' last paper,1 the audit committee membership requirements imposed by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission and the US securities markets were discussed. In particular, the authors discussed these rules and their interaction with one another, focusing primarily on the rules requiring each audit committee member to be independent of management and financially literate, and at least one member of the audit committee to qualify as a financial expert. This paper highlights the added complexities audit committee members face as a result of the interplay between the audit committee membership requirements and general corporate law. In this regard, the authors take particular note of recent Delaware case law that potentially bears on the audit committee membership requirements of independence and financial expertise, including case law in which apparently independent directors were disqualified from serving on an independence committee based on alleged conflicts of interest and case law in which the court focused on a director's financial expertise in concluding that the director should be personally liable for approving a particular transaction. While it is important to understand the implications of these cases, directors, including audit committee members, need not overreact. The Delaware Supreme Court, perhaps the most influential court in the US with respect to business cases, has provided welcome guidance and has done so by reaffirming the primacy and vitality of the business judgment rule and in specifically addressing the persuasiveness of arguments that social connections and personal friendships can result in disqualification.