A CLASS OF DOMINANCE SOLVABLE COMMON-VALUE AUCTIONS

被引：17

|

作者：

HARSTAD, RM

LEVIN, D

机构：

来源：

REVIEW OF ECONOMIC STUDIES | 1985年 / 52卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2297669

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

收藏

页码：525 / 528

页数：4

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