DO BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS MATTER - SOME DISCONFIRMING FINDINGS FROM THE CASE OF THE UNITED-STATES-NAVY

Allison's Model III (governmental or bureaucratic politics) suggests that state policies reflect the parochial concerns of intragovernmental ''players in positions'' and the relative power of these players. This article offers a critical test. It examines a policy area-U.S. decisions on the composition of naval forces-in which we would, a priori, expect bureaucratic politices to have a maximum effect and which participants, observers, and scholars have routinely described as critically influenced by bureaucratic politics. This article employs statistical methods to assess whether outcomes have indeed been affected by the parochial priorities and perceptions of individuals who, because of their relative power and the rules of the game, have dominated the relevant bureaucratic action-channels. Contrary to the expectations of the bureaucratic politics literature-indeed, contrary to the reports of firsthand observers and the actors involved-bureaucratic politics do not seem to have mattered: knowledge of bureaucratic interests and power does not permit us to predict outcomes. The article then proceeds to suggest an alternative model of state behavior that does provide significant explanatory power: the article demonstrates that shifts in force posture can be modeled as a function of ideas and images rather than of interests. This gives rise to speculation that in explaining American foreign and security policy the name of the game is not, as Allison suggests, politics, but the competition of ideas for intellectual hegemony.