An Empirical Study on Issues in Taiwanese Employee Reward Plans

被引:2
|
作者
Lin, Wen-Hsiang [1 ]
Ko, Po-Sheng [2 ]
Chien, Hsueh Fang [3 ]
Lee, Wen-Chih [4 ]
机构
[1] I Shou Univ, Dept Accounting, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
[2] Natl Kaohsiung Univ Appl Sci, Dept Publ Finance & Taxat, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
[3] Soochow Univ, Dept Accounting, Taipei, Taiwan
[4] Natl Kaohsiung Univ Appl Sci, Grad Inst Commerce, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
关键词
Employee bonus; employee stock option; rational pricing;
D O I
10.1142/S021909151000186X
中图分类号
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号
0202 ;
摘要
The human resources are the most important input for the enterprise, so the management of talents is necessary. Especially under level-management philosophy, the agency problem between owners and professional managers often influence the pursuit of enterprise's value maximization. Therefore, an effective rewarding system can make the agent bear some performance responsibility, and can lighten the idle duty problem. Based on this argument, first, this research examines the implementation of a reward plan with employees' bonus and employees' warrant, and whether it can improve the enterprises' performances and shareholder's value. Second, this research uses the Mishkin test (1983) to analyze whether the investors have rational pricing to employees' reward system.
引用
收藏
页码:45 / 69
页数:25
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