RIPOFFS, LEMONS, AND REPUTATION FORMATION IN AGENCY RELATIONSHIPS - A LABORATORY MARKET STUDY

被引：40

作者：

DEJONG, DV

FORSYTHE, R

LUNDHOLM, RJ

机构：

来源：

JOURNAL OF FINANCE | 1985年 / 40卷 / 03期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2327806

中图分类号：

F8 [财政、金融];

学科分类号：

0202 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：809 / 820

页数：12

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