AN EVALUATION OF LEARNING IN THE BILATERAL WINNERS CURSE

被引：106

作者：

BALL, SB

BAZERMAN, MH

CARROLL, JS

机构：

[1] NORTHWESTERN UNIV,KELLOGG GRAD SCH MANAGEMENT,EVANSTON,IL 60201

[2] MIT,ALFRED P SLOAN SCH MANAGEMENT,CAMBRIDGE,MA 02139

来源：

ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR AND HUMAN DECISION PROCESSES | 1991年 / 48卷 / 01期

基金：

美国国家科学基金会;

关键词：

D O I：

10.1016/0749-5978(91)90002-B

中图分类号：

B849 [应用心理学];

学科分类号：

040203 ;

摘要：

Recent research on bilateral bargaining behavior under uncertainty has found that, under asymmetric information, negotiators develop inferior bidding strategies because they fail to incorporate valuable information about the decisions of their opponents. This results in negative profits, or the "winner's curse." The present study provided subjects multiple opportunities for feedback as well as experience in both negotiation roles. Neither learning opportunity eliminates the winner's curse. © 1991.

引用

页码：1 / 22

页数：22

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[1] MARKET FOR LEMONS - QUALITY UNCERTAINTY AND MARKET MECHANISM [J].