RELYING ON THE INFORMATION OF INTERESTED PARTIES

被引：540

作者：

MILGROM, P ^{[1
]}

ROBERTS, J ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] STANFORD UNIV,STANFORD,CA 94305

来源：

RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS | 1986年 / 17卷 / 01期

关键词：

D O I：

10.2307/2555625

中图分类号：

F [经济];

学科分类号：

02 ;

摘要：

引用

页码：18 / 32

页数：15

共 21 条

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