EXECUTIVE PAY AND PERFORMANCE - EVIDENCE FROM THE US BANKING INDUSTRY

被引：185
|
作者：
HUBBARD, RG
PALIA, D
机构：
[1] Columbia Business School, Columbia University, New York
来源：
JOURNAL OF FINANCIAL ECONOMICS | 1995年 / 39卷 / 01期
关键词：
PAY; PERFORMANCE; CORPORATE CONTROL; DEREGULATION; BANK; JEL CLASSIFICATION; G32; G38; G21;
D O I：
10.1016/0304-405X(94)00816-J
中图分类号：
F8 [财政、金融];
学科分类号：
0202 ;
摘要：
This paper examines CEO pay in the banking industry and the effect of deregulating the market for corporate control. Using panel data on 147 banks over the 1980s, we find higher levels of pay in competitive corporate control markets, i.e., those in which interstate banking is permitted. We also find a stronger pay-performance relation in deregulated interstate banking markets. Finally, CEO turnover increases substantially after deregulation. These results provide evidence of a managerial talent market - one which matches the level and structure of pay with the competitiveness of the banking environment.
引用
收藏
页码：105 / 130
页数：26
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