EVOLUTIONARY STABILITY IN REPEATED GAMES PLAYED BY FINITE AUTOMATA

被引:205
|
作者
BINMORE, KG
SAMUELSON, L
机构
[1] UNIV MICHIGAN, DEPT ECON, ANN ARBOR, MI 48109 USA
[2] UNIV WISCONSIN, DEPT ECON, MADISON, WI 53706 USA
关键词
D O I
10.1016/0022-0531(92)90037-I
中图分类号
F [经济];
学科分类号
02 ;
摘要
We consider a game in which "meta-players" choose finite automata to play a repeated stage game. Meta-players' utilities are lexicographic, first increasing in the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs of the repeated game and second decreasing in the number of states in their automaton. We examine the outcomes in this game which satisfy a version of evolutionary stability that has been modified to permit existence. We find that such automata must be efficient, in that they must maximize the sum of the (limit-of-the-means) payoffs from the repeated game. © 1992.
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页码:278 / 305
页数:28
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