Bayesian Algorithmic Mechanism Design

被引:0
|
作者
Chawla, Shuchi [1 ]
Sivan, Balasubramanian [2 ]
机构
[1] Univ Wisconsin, Madison, WI 53706 USA
[2] Microsoft Res, Bengaluru, India
关键词
mechanism design; auctions; optimization; approximation; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; Algorithms; Economics; Theory;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
TP39 [计算机的应用];
学科分类号
081203 ; 0835 ;
摘要
This article surveys recent work with an algorithmic flavor in Bayesian mechanism design. Bayesian mechanism design involves optimization in economic settings where the designer possesses some stochastic information about the input. Recent years have witnessed huge advances in our knowledge and understanding of algorithmic techniques for Bayesian mechanism design problems. These include, for example, revenue maximization in settings where buyers have multi-dimensional preferences, optimization of non-linear objectives such as makespan, and generic reductions from mechanism design to algorithm design. However, a number of tantalizing questions remain unsolved. This article is meant to serve as an introduction to Bayesian mechanism design for a novice, as well as a starting point for a broader literature search for an experienced researcher.
引用
收藏
页码:5 / 49
页数:45
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