The conservative equal costs rule, the serial cost sharing rule and the pivotal mechanism: Asymptotic welfare loss comparisons for the case of an excludable public project

被引：0

作者：

Deb R. ^{[1
]}

Razzolini L. ^{[2
]}

Seo T.K. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Department of Economics, Southern Methodist University, Dallas

[2] Department of Economics, School of Business, Virginia Commonwealth University, Richmond, VA 23284-4000

来源：

Review of Economic Design | 2006年 / 10卷 / 3期

关键词：

Asymptotic welfare loss; Efficient surplus; Pivotal mechanism; Serial cost sharing; Strategy proof;

D O I：

10.1007/s10058-006-0010-3

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

We examine the asymptotic behavior of two strategyproof mechanisms discussed by Moulin for public goods - the conservative equal costs rule (CER) and the serial cost sharing rule (SCSR) - and compare their performance to that of the pivotal mechanism (PM) from the Clarke-Groves family. Allowing the individuals' valuations for an excludable public project to be random variables we show under very general assumptions that expected welfare loss generated by the CER as the size of the population increases becomes arbitrarily large. However all moments of the SCSR's random welfare loss asymptotically converge to zero. The PM does better than the SCSR with its welfare loss converging even more rapidly to zero. © Springer-Verlag 2006.

引用

页码：205 / 232

页数：27