Did Kant respect persons?

被引：2
作者：
Neumann M. [1 ]
机构：
[1] Department of Philosophy, Trent University, Peterborough
来源：
Res Publica | 2000年 / 6卷 / 3期
关键词：
Kant; Liberalism; Libertarianism; Nozick; Rawls; Respect for persons;
D O I：
10.1023/A:1009619600489
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
The illusion that Kant respects persons comes from ascribing contemporary meanings to purely technical terms within his second formulation of the categorical imperative, "[A]ct so that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or in that of another, always as an end and never as a means only." When we realize that "humanity" means rational nature and "person" means the supersensible self (homo noumenon), we find that we are to respect, not human selves in all their diversity (homo phaenomenon), but rational selves in all their sameness, in their unvarying conformity to the universal principles of pure practical reason. Contemporary individualism gets no support from Kant. © 2000 Kluwer Academic Publishers.
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页码：285 / 299
页数：14
相关论文
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