Implementation with socially responsible agents

被引：0
|
作者：
Makoto Hagiwara
Hirofumi Yamamura
Takehiko Yamato
机构：
[1] Tokyo Institute of Technology,Department of Industrial Engineering and Economics, School of Engineering
[2] Hokusei Gakuen University,Department of Law and Economics, School of Economics
来源：
Economic Theory Bulletin | 2018年 / 6卷 / 1期
关键词：
Social responsibility; Nash implementation; Outcome mechanism; Common knowledge; C72; D71; D78;
D O I：
10.1007/s40505-017-0123-6
中图分类号：
学科分类号：
摘要：
We consider the implementation problem with socially responsible agents who want to report a socially desirable outcome to a mechanism designer. We design a simple and natural mechanism in which each agent reports an outcome. We show that if there are at least two socially responsible agents, then the mechanism implements any unanimous social choice correspondence in Nash equilibria with at least three agents.
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页码：55 / 62
页数：7
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