The Forgotten Risk: Financial Incentives

被引:0
|
作者
Gerrit Zalm
机构
[1] CEO,
[2] ABN-AMRO Bank,undefined
来源
De Economist | 2009年 / 157卷
关键词
Behavioral effects; Incentives; Remuneration schemes; Risk taking; G29; G32; M52;
D O I
暂无
中图分类号
学科分类号
摘要
The number of risks that are taken into account by risk managers has grown over the years, but they still have a blind spot for the danger that remuneration schemes and financial incentives can lead to more risk taking. Such an effect constitutes a regime change, making standard statistical analyses of previous data obsolete. Common remuneration contracts for hedge fund managers and bank traders provoke risk taking and lead to volatile results. The incentive structure of rating agencies sheds doubts on the quality of their judgment. Risk managers should address the behavioral effects of incentive schemes, both inside and outside their firm. Incentive schemes should be corrected in such a way that only long-term results pay off.
引用
收藏
页码:209 / 213
页数:4
相关论文
共 50 条