Congressional polarization and limitation riders in foreign aid appropriations

Critics often accuse Congress of abdicating its constitutional authority in foreign policy. One source of evidence of congressional abdication is the relative lack of legislation authorizing foreign aid and other foreign policy tools. Because of recent gridlock, Congress now authorizes foreign policy the only way it can: in annual appropriations bills. I argue that this change in legislative strategy does not necessarily reflect an abdication by Congress. Instead, an increase in party polarization, which leads to the perceived abdication of foreign policy, simply shifts Congress’s legislating abilities to “limitation riders,” or legislative provisions written into appropriations bills. I find that an increase in polarization increases Congress’s use of these riders. I also find that polarization has encouraged Congress to use limitation riders in new ways. While foreign aid-related limitation riders once only consisted of contract and budget-related issues, they now comprise a wide variety of foreign and domestic policy issues. Congressional reliance on limitation riders has increased due to polarization and has consequences for foreign policy.