Board members and company value

被引：33

作者：

Yermack D. ^{[1
]}

机构：

[1] Stern School of Business, New York University, New York, NY 10012-1126

来源：

Financial Markets and Portfolio Management | 2006年 / 20卷 / 1期

关键词：

Corporate governance; Regulation; Stock price effect; Value of board member;

D O I：

10.1007/s11408-006-0003-9

中图分类号：

学科分类号：

摘要：

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director's occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.

引用

页码：33 / 47

页数：14

共 19 条

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