Auctions with endogenous valuations: the snowball effect revisited

被引：0
|
作者：
Kala Krishna
机构：
[1] Department of Economics,
[2] Pennsylvania State University,undefined
[3] Kern Graduate Building,undefined
[4] University Park,undefined
[5] PA 16802,undefined
[6] USA (e-mail: kmk4@psu.edu),undefined
来源：
Economic Theory | 1999年 / 13卷
关键词：
Keywords and Phrases: Sequential auctions; Endogenous valuations; Evolution of market structure.; JEL Classification Numbers: C72; D43; D44; D45.;
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摘要：
This paper looks at the determination of ownership of capacity when there are two ex-ante symmetric agents bidding for many units of capacity which are sold sequentially. It is shown that convexity of payoffs in the final stage of the game is sufficient to ensure monopolization of capacity, but that increasing returns to scale are not sufficient to ensure monopolization.
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页码：377 / 391
页数：14
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